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Companies operating in turbulent environments must face up to the uncertainty coming rapidly 
from both changing technologies and global competition. Advanced technolgies such as flexible 
manufacturing systems or CNC machines are not mass produced goods but custom-made and 
highly unique products. Full utilization of these technologies can only be obtained through day-
to-day organizational learning at the operational level. Operational learning is the term used to 
describe organizational learning at lower levels in the chain of command. Learning 
organizations are able to sustain innovative managerial practices at this operationallevel (Mills 
and Friesen, 1992). 
The importance of operationallearning is illustrated in the design of innovative automobile plants 
which are explicitly designed to foster it (Adler and Cole, 1993, 1994; Berggren, 1994). 
Unfortunately, most of this literature takes an operations management perspective (Schein, 
1993). The influence on organizational learning of specific elements of the organizational 
structure such as the information system has deserved a much less attention . 
The internal structure of the firm stores its organizational memory since the former is the result 
of organizational struggles and compromises with respect to responsibilities (Hall, 1991; Walsh 
and Ungson, 1991). Particularly, the information system (e.g.; the budgeting system) keeps the 
memory of the formal organization. The increasing evidence on the changing role of information 
systems in general and management accounting systems (MAS) in particular mainly focuses on 
the technical aspects of the systems such as the misguiding effects of MAS on investment 
appraisal, pricing or make-or-buy decisions (Johnson and Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan and Norton, 
1992). Yet, there is li mited evidence on the explicit role of MAS in the sustainability of 
operational learning. This lack of evidence is particularly relevant when addressing issues such 
as the potential effects of MAS on the failure of innovative learning projects or when analyzing 
the functioning of these projects in different countries. 
Current managerial practices assume that once a given level of organizational learning is 
reached, that level is to be maintained in the future. Hence, learning is understood as a 
cumulative and forward process with no steps back. Managers barely accept that a learning 
process could be disrupted by a process of forgetting. In this regard, it is considered that 
forgetting takes place when sorne successful managerial practices are no longer implemented 
nor replaced by others with the intent of achieving a higher level of learning. In the wel1 known 
case of a cost learning curve, discontinued use of these successful practices and its related 
forgetfulness would result in the return to previous cost levels of production. The persistence 
of operationallearning is not a simple task; it requires the simultaneous implementation of many 
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successful improvements. The non-implementation of one of these sllccessful practices has 
disturbing effects on manufacturing performance; organizational forgetting exists even when 
managers are unaware of it. 
Organizational forgetting has received much attention in the managerialliterature. Forgetting has 
come forward as the supporting evidence of laboratory simulations to estimate cost increases 
(Bailey, 1989), or aiming at the development of a procedure for estimating the amount of 
learning depreciation that occurs (Argote, Beckman and Epple, 1990). In both studies, authors 
gave emphasis to calculation and estimation of forgetting rather than to the analysis of the 
process itself. 
The purpose of this paper is to study the process of organizational learning and how it can 
deteriorate in a reversed process of organizational forgetting. We utilize an structural perspective 
because some elements of the organizational structure such as the budgeting system play a 
central role in the storage and retrieval of organizational memory. Therefore, it is questioned 
whether the organizational structure could be also relevant in fostering a process of 
organizational forgetting. 
To examine the potential impact of national characterictics on the learning and forgetting 
processes, empirical evidence has been gathered in two different European countries: Spain and 
Sweden. The study sites consists of the subsidiaries of two large multinational car corporations; 
General Motors and Volvo. Two long term projects were carried out at the Volvo Components 
plants located in the cities of Floby, Koping and Lindesberg (Sweden) and the Delco Chassis 
division plant located in Puerto Real (Spain) during three and two and a half years, respectively. 
Both of these projects intended to foster operational learning throllgh teamwork, aimed to 
achieve improvements in productivity, quality and working conditions. Both projects were 
independent of each other and started in the same year. 
Evidence co1lected from the Spanish setting has come from the minutes of team meetings as well 
as from interviews with the participants in the project. A workshop was also held with the 
participation of the middle managers that worked on the project and present managers. 
Additiona1ly, two general rounds of interviews were undertaken. In the first round, a1l 
participants were questioncd about the underlying reasons for setting up the teams, their goals 
and the causes which explain their continuation and dissappearance. A final round of interviews 
was undertaken to discuss sorne preliminary conclusions. Interviews were not taped, but written 
notes were taken. Data collection took place once the project was over; the author was a passive 
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observer of team developments. With respect to the Swedish side of the cases, an author joined 
the activity of the teams as an external consultant. He had free access to the teams and could 
also advise them in designing the indexes of performance. He was, therefore, a participating 
observer. 
A more detailed description of the settings is given next. The results of both experiments are 
described in due course. The paper concludes by providing an analysis of the evidence and by 
posing sorne questions for further analyses. 
THE SETTINGS. 
Both subsidiaries have in common that they produce for the car European assembly market. 
Therefore, they operate in a highly competitive market and use advanced technology. In the 
same year, the headquarters of Volvo Components and the plant management of the Delco 
Chassis plant decided to implement a process of decentralized decision making down to the 
operational level to speed up organizational learning. A key element of this process was to 
provide the teams with suitable information. Apart from this, the two settings were remarkably 
different. 
The Delco Chassis plant manufactures suspension systems. The factory was intended to seU 
components to European assembly plants of General Motors as weU as to companies outside the 
multinational group. The factory is located in an underdeveloped area by European economic 
standards which has a high unemployment rateo Consequently, Delco did not have problems to 
recruit qualified personnel. During the setup process of the plant no efforts were made to 
produce for outside customers. Once the setup process was completed, the management team 
realized that the factory had surplus capacity and was inflexible; it was not possible to make 
parts slíghtly different from a narrow set of product specifications. The plant was unprofitable 
and there were no possibilities of long-term survival unless it was able to seU its products to 
outside customers. The plant had to take advantage of the instaUed capacity by making the 
manufacturing operations more flexible. This manufacturing inflexibility was matched by a 
bureaucratic organizational structure. A strict and highly formalised budgeting process was the 
main example of this bureaucracy. The decision-making power was very centralized and proved 
to be unable to cope with the uncertainties created by the manufacturing technology. 
After a capacity study, four areas were considered to be the bottlenecks of the factory. The 
plant ' s directors considered that it would be helpful to form working teams in order to increase 
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capacity and production compliance, quality and improved working conditions. The four 
bottleneck areas of the organization would be involved in a teamwork project. These areas 
represented a sman part of the whole shop floor and the project was restricted to these areas 
only. The teams operated for periods ranging between 1,5 and 2,5 years. 
Teams were formed by middle managers (industrial engineer, maintenance engineer, 
manufacturing engineer, maintenance foreman and front line supervisor) and all the operators 
working in the respective area. The teams operated in an informal way. The bureaucratic 
structure of Delco Chassis never allowed them to be formally recognized in the organizational 
chart. Meetings took place after the first production shift and used to last two hours. Operators 
working during the first shift received two hours of overtime payment. Operators who had to 
work during the second shift did not receive any extra payment but they did not have to run the 
production during that time. 
Delco had already put into force an improvement suggestions programo As a result of this 
program, operators were rewarded with a bonus of lO% of the savings obtained during two 
years of a succesfully implemented suggestion. Operators agreed to share any reward that was 
a result of suggestions made by any of them. There were no other tangible benefits for team 
members. 
The teams themselves created an information system which provided them with ad hoc 
information about the problems under consideration. Nevertheless, sorne items were regularly 
gathered and discussed at the meetings; quality, production schedule compliance and 
consumption of maintenance services. This information collected by the teams was fully 
independent from that provided by the central (budgeting) system. Although the budgeting 
system was the reporting venue in Delco, teams did not receive external information about their 
activities. Reporting of team activities was provided by the distribution of the minutes of the 
week1y meetings among any interested individuals in the organization. 
This paper reports the development of one of the teams, Team A, which portraits the teamwork 
project. Supporting evidence of the other areas as well as of a control group is also provided. 
Volvo Components is a subsidiary of the Volvo group with 6,000 employees. It has a strategic 
role within the corporation since it has to deliver sub-assembly parts to the different assembly 
sites at Volvo. At the time of the reported project Volvo Components was profitable. Except 
sorne minor sales to SAAB, the Volvo Group was the only customer of Volvo Components. The 
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parent company could choose a component producer (and competitor) other than the subsidiary. 
To make their choice on any particular bid, the parent company considered the following 
variables (quoted in decreasing order of importance): quality, delivery time, flexibility and 
productivity. 
Regarding the organizational chart of Volvo Components, the high degree of vertical integration 
within the group brought about that sorne functions, such as product design or marketing, were 
not under command of the subsidiary, but were directly carried out by the parent company. At 
this time the subsidiary put into practice an organizational reshuffle, moving from a functional 
to a divisional structure. Therefore, departments like Production, Materials Management, etc., 
were removed and four business units were settled: cars, trucks, marines and civil machinery. 
The redesign of the information system on the operational level was also under consideration. 
Consequently, a pilot project was designed and implemented. The project involved three teams 
in three different plants: Floby, K6ping and Lindesberg. The Floby plant made hubs, brake 
drums and drive shafts for rear axles. Cog wheels and shafts for heavy gear boxes were made 
in the K6ping setting. Finally, cog wheels for rear axles were produced in Lindesberg. 
Teams consisted of a supervisor, a foreman and a number of operators ranging from nine to 
twelve people. Teams were recognized in the organizational structure as such, and the supervisor 
is a key individual in Volvo's operations management. The Volvo project used the existing 
teamwork structure to take a step forward in the decentralization process through the 
implementation of an information support system at this local leve!. 
The controller' s office and an external consultant provided some help to the teams in the design 
of the MAS to be used at the operational leve!. The so-called local information systems released 
information on quality, set-up machine time and indirect materials consumption. As in the 
Spanish case, financial information was not regularly used by the teams. 
This paper will study the case of the team working at the Floby plant because it exemplifies the 
developments which tookplace. 
5 
GETTING RESULTS 
Team A exemplifies the Delco teamwork project. This team made an initiallist of 70 problems. 
Those problems were narrowed down to comprise the 10 most important ones. Although there 
was an initial agreement not to deal with problems outside of the team 's control, the list of 
problems showed that to accomplish certain actions, coordination with other departments was 
required, (e.g. to improve the flow of materials or the quality of raw materials). 
Actions were mainly taken on controllable problems. Interdepartmental coordination in teamwork 
was a direct consequence of group dynamics. To improve throughput, operators agreed to rotate 
during the coffee breaks and changes of shifts. With this action, it was possible to lengthen 
production time one more hour per day. All these actions brought about an increase of 58 % in 
the number of pieces produced per shift after four months of teamwork. Team A increased 
production by 96.9% after sixteen months of teamwork. 
As time passed, problems arose which were beyond the team 's control and required coordination 
with other departments, such as Quality Control, Production Control, Purchasing, Security and 
a special task force on scrap reduction. As finding a solution reqllired a substantial amollnt of 
time, the minutes contain an identical list of problems for weeks. Twenty months after the 
beginning of the project, the team decided that they will meet fortnightly. In addition to 
irresolvable problems of coordination, the minutes begin to mention some others which were 
previously resolved but had reappeared. Most significantly, the operators refused to rotate during 
their coffee breaks and changes of shifts. Four months after the last periodical meeting, team 
production was 5,023 pieces per shift (Table 1). 
TABLE 1 Tü APPEAR HERE. 
Team B was also involved in the teamwork project. There was a sustained increase over the 22 
months that lasted the teamwork periodo The sllbsequent output decrease went below the results 
achieved before the beginning of the project. 
In order to al10w comparisons, data on pieces produced per shift were also gathered from the 
daily work-sheets of Team C. This team was not involved in any teamwork project. For the 
purposes of this paper, Team C can be considered a control group. Table 1 shows that the area 
run by Team C achieved a stabilized improvement in number of pieces prodllced per shift during 
the teamwork periodo 
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Production decreases in the Delco setting were not due to reductions in consumer demando On 
the contrary, the European car market experienced a steady expansion during the period under 
consideration. 
No concrete data are available about direct labor consumption by the teams. Nevertheless, there 
is an unanimous consensus amongst present and past middle managers that the amount of direct 
labor did not experience significant changes during the teamwork periodo There were no changes 
in the number of operators per machine and the number of daily shifts remained stable during 
that period. 
The Floby team runs three production lines. Two lines are basically fonned by CNC machines. 
This machinery is coupled to the third production lineo The latter was formed by a controlling 
computer and several robots to handle materials. Team meetings were informal and took place 
whenever a problem required the consideration of the team. The team followed the strategy of 
considering the problems one at a time. Rather than focusing on the most important problems, 
they dealt with those ones which were easily resolvable. For instance, the budgeting system 
reported about negative variances in cutting tools consllmption. The foreman wanted to follow 
up the use of cutting tools in two lathes on the drive shaft lineo Five different cutting tools can 
be attached to the rotating heads of these lathes. Each tool has a number of cutting edges and 
when an edge is worn out, quality declines and tools have to be replaced. Team members 
decided to purchase a different set of cutting tools after discussing the problem with the supplier. 
These new tools had similar prices. Four weeks after using the new cutting tools a three days 
manual follow up was put into force. Operators just counted how many drive shafts had been 
processed by every cutting too1. As a result 574 drive shafts were processed. This outcome 
required the consllmption of 52 cutting tools. The standard consumption was 74.3 cutting tools 
(Table 2). It brought abollt a positive monetary variance of 28% in cutting tools consllmption. 
TABLE 2 TO APPEAR HERE. 
Volvo operators received extra-wages linked to positive variances between actual and standard 
production. One year after the beginning of the project, team members decided to take 
responsibilities for production planning. In short, it meant that the team itself could decide what 
production rate target they intended to keep during the following six month periodo The 
production-rate was the result of dividing actual by standard production. The outcome would set 
the basis for the discllssion about the next six month periodo 
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Two main sources of improvement were under consideration; rejects and downtime. Rejects 
were c1assified as M-faults (Materials) or P-faults (Production). Team members managed to 
reduce M-faults substantially by setting up a communication hot line with a supervisor at the 
supplying foundry. P-faults remained stable and below the budget throughout the periodo 
Regarding downtime, the team considered that it could be reduced by the rationalization of 
production methods as well as by increasing flexibility. Team members considered the latter as 
a problem under their scope of control. Due to the high technology environment, operators were 
specialized in their machine group. It brought about that the team was vulnerable to absenteeism. 
Therefore, team members decided to set up a program to enable all operators to run all machine 
groups. Breakdowns and machine setups were used to teach other operators abour the features 
of different machines. Table 3 shows targets and outcomes for the first six month period after 
the implementation of these specific actions. 
TABLE 3 TO APPEAR HERE. 
As a result of these and other follow-ups the Floby team achieved a continuous increase of the 
pieces produced per year. As shown in Table 3, this improvement was also matched by a 
sustained decrease in the required amount of direct labor hours to make that output. These 
results were highly praised by the management of Volvo Components. The project was expanded 
through the Components division and the supervisor of the Floby team became a popular person 
within the Volvo group. He enjoyed a part-time job as a consultant to train other teams in 
similar experiments. 
TABLE 4 TO APPEAR HERE. 
LEARNING vs FORGETTING 
The Volvo Components case shows a long period of organizationallearning based upon a great 
deal of small improvements. On the other hand, the Delco Chassis evidence brings to light a 
long period of organizational learning followed by a period of organizational forgetting. These 
processes of organizational learning and forgetting can be explained through a twofold analysis 
dealing with the inner and outer environments of the organizations. With respect to the inner 
environment, aspects related to the organizational structure, the budgeting and the incentive 
systems will be analyzed. Regarding the outer environment, the national culture of each 
particular setting might be considered an influential factor in the development of the projects. 
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The shield 
The organizational structure plays a significant role in the development of the learning and 
forgetting processes. It can act as a shield against learning, as in the Delco Chassis case. Three 
elements concerning the organizational structure will be analyzed; the (non)recognition of the 
teams in the organizational chart, the narrow focus of the budgeting system and the incentives 
system. 
The (non)recognition of the teams in the organizational chart. Since the organizational structure 
is the result of compromises and negotiations, it stores the organizational memory. The 
comparison between Delco and Volvo brings forward their different organizational histories. 
Volvo is a company with a long tradition in job enrichment through job designo Semi-
autonomous teams were established by Volvo in the early seventies as a tool to handle high rates 
of absenteeism and personnel turnover. The challenge for Swedish companies was to recruit and 
maintain the best operators. Teamwork as well as a decentralized team structure were an integral 
part of Volvo 's organizational structure (Berg, 1985). The communication between a given team 
and the rest of the organization had a formal recognition in the organizational chart. 
On the other hand, Delco was still a YOllng company and as in many other aspects, had no 
previous tradition of teamwork. When teamwork started IIp, teams were not recognized in the 
organizational chart. Teams were sllpported by the management board but their activities were 
much more on the side of the informal organization. Delco teams decided to deal with 
controllable problems. Due to the coordination among team members, it was possible to achieve 
dramatic improvements. 
When most of the controllable problems were solved, teams had to start dealing with problems 
beyond their boundaries (Llewellyn, 1994). At this moment, teams had to face lack of 
recognition by the rest of the organization. There was no formal structure to nurture those 
specific communications. Delco was a bllreaucratic organization and it was difficult to get 
resources outside the formal procedures. For the rest of the organization, the claims of team 
members were perceived as made by particular individuals. Initia1 dialogue and commitment 
amongst team members was grounded on the positive attitudes of the participants in the project. 
After sorne time, it was necessary to transform attitudes into structures. This did not occur and 
the result was the development of a process of organizational forgetting. Routines which had 
been learnt as a result of an internal commitment amongst team members (e.g., to reduce setup 
machine time) were given up. As long as Volvo Components organizational structure recognized 
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teamwork, it provided a better venue for the development of a sustained organizationallearning. 
To sum up, pilot projects aiming at organizational learning need to be supported by the 
organizational structure. This support can prevent the development of a forgetting process as 
long as formal recognition nurtures the communication between teams and the rest of the 
organization. Since most of the organizational problems are not clearly within the boundaries 
of any particular team, this formal recognition of responsibilities would back the process of give 
and take which is usual among different organizational subunits. 
The (narrow) focus of the budgeting system. Regarding operational units, the logic of central 
information systems is non-relevant for decision-making purposes (Gronlund, 1990). Central 
information systems such as the budgeting system are correct for control purposes. The 
budgeting system comprises goals to be attained, not activities to be accomplished. Therefore, 
there is a built in contradiction between systems designed to control performance (budgeting 
system) and systems designed and used on the operational level for decision-making purposes 
(MAS used by team members). The latter was helpful for operators and middle managers in 
handling their activities, the former imposed a hectic pressure on team developments. 
The budgeting system entails that incremental learning is to take place. It is assumed that once 
a level of performance is achieved, it is to be maintained (or even il11proved) in the future. 
However, reality shows that learning is not a continuous and incremental process. On the 
contrary, it has to be constructed every day. The production system of cOl11panies which operate 
in world-wide markets is designed to develop its full capacity. This capacity is only achieved 
through the simultaneous implementation of a great deal of costly practices (e.g., coffee-break 
rotations). Operational level MAS used by teams at both settings reported non-financial 
information, containing soft-data which could shed light about potential sources of learning (e.g., 
downtime and absenteeism in the Volvo case). On the other hand, the budgeting system just 
reports financial figures which summarize a great deal of specific and costly practices. Those 
demanding financial figures are agressive towards team mel11bers and barely sympathetic with 
the effort carried out by them. Hence, teams not only perceive budgets as a useless tool in their 
decision-making process, but also as a set of documents which are ready to consider as normal 
and standarized all the extraordinary improvements achieved during the past periodo 
The budgeting system of Delco and its related concept of hierarchy and discipline provides a too 
narrow window for improvement, change and learning. When resources for teamwork purposes 
are demanded within the budgeting period, the likely answer is: "It might be a good idea, but 
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not now. Why do not you make that proposal when preparing the next budget? That is when all 
demands are made at the same time and that is when they all can be coordinated into an effective 
plan" . 
In the Delco case, the budgeting system played a negative role with respect to team 
development. Improvements achieved by the teams were not matched by a parallel allocation of 
resources. As noted aboye, teams were never recognized in the organizational structure. 
Consequently, teams did not manage any specific budget. While teams were asked to improve 
their practices, they did not receive any additional resources. A1though Volvo teams also had 
strict budgets there were two outstanding differences; on the one hand teams themselves were 
recognized by the budgets, on the other hand budgeting control focused on strategic control 
rather than on the financial control exercised at the Delco setting. 
In summary, the incremental logic of the budgeting system by itself appears to be a main 
obstacle for the development of organizational learning. Teams did not have specific resources 
to support their actions. The false recognition of the teams was eased by the demanding 
requirements stated in the operational standards which informed the budgeting system matched 
as well as by the shortage of financial resources . 
The reward system. The development of teamwork could imply an intrinsic incentive for those 
involved in it because team members perceived that their jobs were important, they had 
autonomy and feedback on results (Vroom, 1966). However, t~ese motivating factors need 
regular reinforcement. As time went by, team members had to deal with problems which were 
beyond their scope of control; they had no autonomy. There was also negative feedback on 
results; the operationallevel MAS informed that they were unable to attain the list of problems. 
Finally, the Spanish labor unions do not allow wage increases tied to performance improvements 
in particular areas of a given company. The Delco case shows that teams had initial intrinsic 
motivation. When it dissappeared, organizational learning became organizational forgetting. 
Volvo teams also enjoyed intrinsic motivational factors. Additionally, team members could enjoy 
wage increases as a result of productivity improvements. In the Volvo case, the joint effect of 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivational factors nurtured a sustained organizational learning. 
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The cross-cultural perspective. 
Cross-cultural differences are helpful to explain occupational values (Goffee and Jones, 1995; 
Gray, 1995). In this regard, it is noteworthy to point out that Sweden and Spain are countries 
with a remarkable difference in their cultures. A five dimensions scale has been used to 
represent a national culture (Hofstede, 1980; 1991). These dimensions of the national culture 
influence the particular behavior of the individuals in the organizations. For the purposes of this 
analysis, there are two Hofstede's dimensions of relevant interest for the purposes of this paper: 
power distance and uncertainty avoidance. Power distance refers to the dependence relationships 
amongst people in a country. In small power distance countries there is limited dependence of 
subordinates on bosses, and a preference for consultation, that is, interdependence between boss 
and subordinates. The emotional distance between them is relatively small: subordinates will 
quite readily approach and contradict their bosses. In large power distance countries there is 
considerable dependence of subordinates on bosses. Subordinates respond by either preferring 
such dependence (in the form of an autocratic and paternalistic boss) or rejecting it entirely, 
which in psychology is known as counterdependence: that is dependence, but with a negative 
signo Large power distance countries thus show a polarization between dependence and 
counterdependence. In these cases, the emotional distance between subordinates and their bosses 
is large: subordinates are unlikely to approach and contradict their bosses. 
Spain is a country with a large power distance. It is ranked in position 31 amongst 53 countries 
or regions. On the contrary, Sweden is a country with a very smal1 power distance; it is ranked 
in position 47/48 amongst the referred 53 countries or regions. 
Uncertainty avoidance is defined as the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened 
by uncertain or unknown situations. This feeling is, among other things, expressed through 
nervous stress in a need for predictability: a need for written and unwritten rules. Sweden is a 
country with a weak uncertainty avoidance; it is ranked in position 45/50 amongst 53 countries 
or regions. On the other hand, Spain has a ~trong uncertainty avoidance; it is ranked in position 
10/15 on this particular scale. 
The joint effect of power distance and uncertainty avoidance can be used to link national cultures 
with suitable organizational structures. Sweden is featured by its small power distance and weak 
uncertainty avoidance. Its social structure is flat. On the other hand, Spain is a country with 
large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance. Its social structure can be compared to 
a pyramid of people. 
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These arguments provide a complementary perspective to the analysis of the organizational 
structure on the different results of the teamwork project in Delco and Volvo. Volvo operates 
in a country with a flat societal structure. The Volvo group has been quite successful in adapting 
itself to this societal structure. Teamwork projects, since the early Kalmar plant experiments, 
are efforts to adapt the organizational structure of the company to the usual rules of society. On 
the other hand, Spain has a large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance. It means that 
subordinates are dependent on bosses. Subordinates will barely approach their bosses and 
contradict them. In Delco, when there was not a good relationship between teams and the rest 
of the organization, middle managers had that cultural unability to raise the issue to their bosses. 
Moreover, since there was not any written organizational procedure legitimating the teamwork 
project, middle managers felt even more unable to argue for the value of teamwork. 
Pilot projects are regarded as prerequisite for the development of sucessfullearning experiments 
(Beckhard and Harris, 1989). Nevertheless, in countries with large power distance and high 
uncertainty avoidance it is also needed to extend the project across the organization as soon as 
successful results are achieved. In countries with these particular cultural features, this decision 
is to be made the top management since middle managers find it difficult to raise project validity 
claims. Middle managers who run the Delco project acknowledged the false recognition of their 
team by the rest of the organization as well as the necessary extension of the project to other 
organizational areas to assure project success. However, they thought that such a particular 
decision was to be made by the top management because it was far beyond their scope of 
responsibilities. 
The Delco case proved that teamwork was able to achieve early success and high levels of 
sustained learning. At that point, the extension of the project to the rest of the organization 
would have the organizational learning to the organization as a whole. In sorne cultural 
environments, top managers should not expect claims coming from the middle managers about 
the extension of these projects. 
These arguments do not imply any sort of determinism or straight cause-effect relationship about 
the success or failure of decentralization projects. On the contrary, it is argued that some cultural 
aspects should taken into consideration when implementing projects which were successful in 
a different national setting. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
More and more organizations are decentralizing their decision-making process to lower levels 
in the chain of command. The aim of this process is to gain competitive capabilities by 
absorbing uncertainty coming from the shop floor. Uncertainty absorption is so important that 
sorne auto plants are explicitly designed to foster this process from the very start. The 
managerial literature is ful1 of (successful) examples of companies which are able to match the 
implementation of this process with the usage of a given technique (e.g., value analysis, quality 
circles, etc). Nevertheless, there is very little empirical evidence on long-term experiments and 
on what happened after a first period of learning and success. This lack of evidence also refers 
to cross-cultural comparisons. In a global business environment, the latter weakness is 
particularly important since cultural characterictics are helpful in explaining the reasons for 
successful implementation of innovative projects. There is a need for cross-national studies on 
the sustainability of learning achievements. 
This paper is based on empirical evidence gathered in two European subsidiaries of Volvo and 
General Motors. Amongst the wide range of possibilities used by managers to foster 
organizational learning, these companies choose problem-solving in current operations and 
support of innovation and experimentation to build for the future (Leonard-Barton, 1992). 
Teamwork projects in Delco and Volvo concluded with the processes of organizational forgetting 
and organizational learning, respectively. The micro and macro-organizationallevels of analysis 
provide an explanation of these developments. 
It is suggested that organizational structure plays a relevant role at the micro-organizational 
leve!. In particular, there are three complementary reasons. First, teams were not formal1y 
reeognized in the organizational chart. Thus, team claims were no longer perceived as such, but 
as demands outlined by individual members of the organization. This false recognition of teams 
by the rest of the organization was particularly important when teams had to solve problems not 
ful1y controllable by them. 
Second, the rigidity of the budget system as wel1 as its incrementallearning logic was perceived 
as too agressive by team members. Improvements achieved by the teams were readily 
incorporated into budget standards, these aggregated figures were not helpful in the decision-
making process nor were fair to many of simultaneous and eostly practices which had to be put 
into force to obtain a persistence learning. Furthermore, budget demands were aceompanied by 
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budget constraints. Team members could only use resources coming from their respective 
functional area. 
Third, the reward system did not make provisions for rewarding productivity increases of the 
teams beyond the suggestion schedule. In short, individuals clearly perceived the pressure of the 
hierarchy because their activities within the team were not recognized as such. It seems to be 
clear that subordinates suffering the imposing hierarchy are not good learners (Zuboff, 1989). 
Organizational learning and forgetting can also be explained from a macro level of analysis. 
Spain is a country with a large power distance and strong uncertainty avoidance. Therefore, it 
is assumed that Spanish middle managers find it difficult to approach their bosses. In particular, 
Spanish middle managers were aware of the convenienceof extending the project to other 
organizational areas but they also considered that the decision had to be made at the top 
management level. Since the extension decision was far beyond their scope of control, middle 
managers considered that their claims wOllld interfere top management' s understanding of the 
sitllation. They kept silent. 
The success of the Volvo case can also be explained from this twofold micro and macro levels 
ofanalysis. In this sense, Volvo implemented a loose-tight control (Peters and Waterman, 1982). 
These authors argue that excellent organizations are characterized by the simultaneous 
implementation of centralization and decentralization process. Althollgh excellent organizations 
are decentralized, they also develop a strong centralization around a set of basic principIes. This 
is the Volvo case. Volvo gave a step forward in its decentralization process through a teamwork 
project dealing with innovative infonnation systems on the lowest organizationallevel. This kind 
of loose control throllgh decentralization is supported by the Swedish cultural characteristics. 
However, Volvo also developed a tight control of the teams through the budget process. Teams 
had to settle their targets for the following period and these targets were the evaluation criteria 
of teams performance. 
To sum up, evidence shown in this paper could be of sorne help for managers aiming to design 
and implement learning projects, particularly when these projects are expected to be succesful 
in different cultural projects. In this regard, more comparative stlldies on long-term learning 
projects is needed. 
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TABLE 1 
Delco Chassis 
(Pieces produced per shift. Monthly average) 
Teamwork Before After four After Right after Five 
starting months of sixteen the end of months 
teamwork teamwork months of the after the 
teamwork teamwork end of the 
project project 
Team A 3,637 4,642.5 7,162 6,016,5 5,023 
Team B 11,125 11,180 12,020 10,980 11,040 
Team C 2,834 2,910 2,955 3,084 N.A. 
(control 
group) 
TABLE 2 
Volvo Components. Floby plant 
(Cutting tool consumption) 
1 2 3 4 5 TOTAL 
Cutting tool 
number 
Standard 22.9 17.2 11.4 11.4 11.4 74.3 
consumption 
Actual 19 14 9 6 4 52 
consumption 
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TABLE 3 
Volvo Components. Floby plant 
(Production targets and outcomes) 
Production line 
Hubs 
Production target 
123% 
Actual production 
123% 
Shafts 121 % 123% 
Drums 123% 126% 
TABLE 4 
Volvo Components at the Floby plant 
(Pieces prodllced per year vs yearly consumption of direct labor hOllrs) 
Teamwork Before the First year Second year Third year 
beginning of 
the project 
Pieces 102,060 103,320 110,220 125,580 
produced per 
year 
Yearly 20,200 19,780 17,960 18,570 
consumption 
of direct labor 
hours 
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